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The legacy electric power distribution system is designed primarily for unidirectional 
power flow from the electric grid made of large rotating electric machine-based generators located 
away from the load centers through highly interconnected transmission and sub-transmission 
network and radial distribution systems.  The legacy distribution network is not designed to handle 
multiple sources of distributed energy resources (DER) such as different forms of photovoltaic 
(PV) systems, electric vehicles (EV), storage and wind power.  However, the future grid is 
transitioning to system with bidirectional power flow at the distribution level with increasing 
penetration of DERs.  DER penetration level is increasing drastically, in particular PV and storage, 
in distribution system and is expected to grow in excess of 50% within few decades.   
The monitoring and efficient control of such DERs requires data and communication that 
allows the integration of DERs with the modern grid.  It also brings vulnerabilities for cyber-
attacks that can have a negative impact on overall electric power system operation.  In order to 
design a cost-effective communication system for a smart distribution system it is necessary to 
consider the cyber-physical relationships as well as the big data analytics and cybersecurity 
features of such design. Those aforementioned features should be included in the early stages of 
ICT design. 
In order to address the new challenges of ICT design for DERs this research studies 
different approaches on how to integrate big data analytics and cybersecurity to the traditional ICT 
design approaches.  
One of the major contributions of this research is the development of a highly detailed 
cyber-physical communication model platform done in Network Simulator 3 that can be used for 
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simulations of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). This simulation platform can be used to 
test and to validate new cybersecurity and data analytics tools of an information and 
communication technology design for smart distribution system. Other contributions include (a) a 
comprehensive study on big data analytics (BDA) for distributed energy resources, based on both 
extensive literature review and mathematical equations for analyzing the amount of data increase 
in observed data from power quality analysis at distribution level. (b)  a set of cybersecurity 
recommendations at device level for improving the overall cybersecurity of distributed energy 
resources, based on the literature review together with the previous research done at the National 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... ix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ................................................................................ 1 
1.1 From the Traditional Grid to the Modern Distribution Grid ................................................. 1 
1.2 Integrating Big Data Analytics and Cybersecurity for Distributed Energy Resources ......... 2 
1.3 Motivation – The Cyber Threat ............................................................................................. 3 
1.4 Cybersecurity Background .................................................................................................... 7 
1.5 Problem Statement .............................................................................................................. 10 
1.6 Dissertation Outline ............................................................................................................. 10 
CHAPTER 2 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DESIGN FOR DERS ..................................................... 13 
2.1 Communication System Design:  Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Overview ... 13 
2.2 Materials and Methods ........................................................................................................ 15 
2.3 Results ................................................................................................................................. 24 
2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 28 
CHAPTER 3 BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES ..................... 30 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 30 
3.2 Big Data Analytics, Data Science, Engineering and Power Quality ................................... 33 
3.3 Exploring Big Data Sources in Power Quality .................................................................... 40 
3.4 BDA Applications in PQ Assessment ................................................................................. 46 
3.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 49 
CHAPTER 4 RECOMMENDED FUNCIONALITIES FOR IMPROVING CS OF DERS .................... 51 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 51 
4.2 Modern DER Functionalities and Cyber-physical Impact .................................................. 54 
vi 
 
4.3 DER Common Vulnerabilities and Cyberattacks ................................................................ 57 
4.4 Recommended Device Level Functionalities for Securing DERs ...................................... 59 
4.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 64 
CHAPTER 5 A TESTBED FOR VALIDATING ELECTRIC SYSTEM DATA CRYPTOGRAPHY .. 66 
5.1 Cryptography Emulation Testbed Overview ....................................................................... 66 
5.2 Utility Controller and Field Device Real Time Emulation ................................................. 67 
5.3 Cryptography Module Devices ........................................................................................... 68 
5.4 Real Communication Network ............................................................................................ 68 
5.5 Data Traffic Monitoring Machine ....................................................................................... 69 
5.6 Virtualized Cyber-physical Environment based on Minimega ........................................... 69 
5.7 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 71 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 72 
6.1 Information and Communication System Design for Distributed Energy Resources ........ 72 
6.2 Big Data Analytics for Distributed Energy Resources ........................................................ 73 
6.3 Cybersecurity Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resources ................................. 74 
6.4 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 76 
CHAPTER 7 FUTURE WORK ............................................................................................................. 77 
APPENDIX SUPPLEMENTAL ELECTRONIC FILE ...................................................................... 78 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1: The development of communication protocols used in power systems. ...................... 1 
Figure 1-2: Smart grid application requirements for ICT design. .................................................. 3 
Figure 1-3: Modern trends in electric distribution systems. ........................................................... 4 
Figure 1-4: Forecast of interconnected devices including utilities for the UK market [33]. .......... 6 
Figure 1-5: Overview of cybersecurity adversaries. ....................................................................... 8 
Figure 1-6: Cybersecurity requirements. ........................................................................................ 9 
Figure 2-1: The IEEE 34 bus feeder single line diagram. Modified from [41]. ........................... 14 
Figure 2-2: The design methodology flowchart. ........................................................................... 15 
Figure 2-3: The daily load profile used as the input for all smart meters. .................................... 19 
Figure 2-4: An example of the XML load measurement from a smart meter. ............................. 19 
Figure 2-5: The global end-to-end delay during the daily cycle. .................................................. 24 
Figure 2-6: The global end-to-end delay during the one measurement cycle. .............................. 25 
Figure 3-1: Supraharmonics emission from modern loads and DERs [64]. ................................. 32 
Figure 3-2: Big Data and Its Characteristics. ................................................................................ 34 
Figure 3-3: Sample of ML algorithms. ......................................................................................... 36 
Figure 3-4: Sample of ML algorithms by objectives. ................................................................... 37 
Figure 3-5: Necessary tools for a BDA framework for PQ applications. ..................................... 38 
Figure 3-6: Proposed framework for using BDA for PQ. ............................................................. 44 
viii 
 
Figure 3-7: Proposed framework for using BDA for PQ monitoring and analysis. ..................... 47 
Figure 4-1: Modern distribution systems and the increase of cyber-physical interdependency. .. 53 
Figure 4-2: Potential physical impact on the distribution systems due to cyberattacks. .............. 56 
Figure 5-1: Power system data traffic emulation testbed. ............................................................. 66 
Figure 5-2: Block diagram of a cyber-physical virtualization testbed for power systems. .......... 70 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2-1 The power system communication protocols ............................................................... 17 
Table 2-2 The communication network traffic estimation ........................................................... 20 
Table 2-3 The simulation parameters ........................................................................................... 23 
Table 2-4 Simulation results ......................................................................................................... 26 
Table 3-1 Required sampling rate for detecting harmonics up to the 2,500th order ..................... 43 
Table 4-1 Recent cyberattacks ...................................................................................................... 52 








I would like to thank is my advisor, Prof. P. K. Sen, for allowing me the opportunity to 
work on a theme related to cybersecurity and renewable energy, two topics I am very passionate 
about. I am very grateful for all his advice and support. Second, I would like to thank all my 
committee members, Prof. Marcelo Godoy Simões, Prof. Chuan Yue, and Prof. Ravel Ammerman. 
All of you helped not only with my research but also as role models of great professors.  
Thanks for all the researchers who worked with me in the Energy Security and Resilience 
Group at the Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and for financial support. I learned a lot from 
the internship and all those lessons will definitely help me throughout my future career. 
I would like to say thanks to Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível 
Superior (CAPES) and the Brazilian government for providing me the financial support that 
allowed me to conduct the research presented in this thesis.  
Thanks for all the help and research feedback from my research colleagues at Colorado 
School of Mines. Specially, Jason, Yaswanth, Emily, Kevin, and Kamel. 
I would like to thank the friends that I made in USA. We all supported each other in a big 
way in our lives. Specially, Helmo, Daniel, Odette, Poorya, Gerardo, Debora, Allan, Ricardo, Ana, 
Lorna, Lucas, Camila, and Miguel. 
I am thankful for all my family’s support from my parents, Vanja and Cosme, and from 
my siblings, Rafael and Raquel. Thanks to my grandfather José Ribamar Bentes Siqueira who is 
my biggest motivation in life. 
xi 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank my ex-wife, Fernanda Leite Lobo for all the encouragement 
and support in these five years of hardships in our lives. I am very grateful to have had her by my 





INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 From the Traditional Grid to the Modern Distribution Grid 
The traditional or legacy electric power systems always had the need of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) in order to achieve the monitoring and most effective control 
of the grid. Prior to 1970’s, there were no standards for the ICT systems, then followed by 
proprietary and industrial protocols that were also known as Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems [1], [2] (Fig. 1-1). As the electric grid became more mature and 
complex, there was a need for enhancing its performance in terms of efficiency, reliability, security 
and flexibility. ICT systems are enablers of such improvements over the legacy electric grid and 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the increased use of digital 
information and controls technology in the power system as one the main aspects of the modern 
electric networks also known as smart grids [3].  
 
Figure 1-1: The development of communication protocols used in power systems. 
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Even though smart grids allow a plethora of new improved electric grid applications such 
as dynamic optimization of grid operations, incorporation of demand response, and integration of 
distributed energy resources (DER) including large scale wind and solar (renewable sources), they 
also increase the interdependency between the power grid and the ICT systems [4]–[6]. Despite 
all the benefits of the smart grid, the cyber-physical interdependency of modern power systems 
makes the problems of reliability, operation, and security more complex than in the legacy electric 
networks [7]. The ICT network design for smart power applications becomes an even more critical 
task [8], [9]. Further, as the smart grids are becoming more distributed, highly interactive and more 
intelligent in terms of ICT complexity, the reliability and security of such grids becomes in danger 
not just from traditional threats, but now also from emerging cyber-threats. Since the increased use 
of ICT adds and open the gates for more cybersecurity vulnerabilities, the smart grids should be 
designed to be more resilient so they can cope with the emerging cyber threats [10]–[13].  
1.2 Integrating Big Data Analytics and Cybersecurity for Distributed Energy Resources 
The future distribution systems still need ICT systems to support all of its applications. In the 
past few years, several surveys have been published addressing the smart grid applications and 
how to design it, as well as, what are the main ICT technologies used [14]–[17]. This research 
adopted a communication network design process similar to the one proposed in [17] because its 
methodology is tailored to specific needs of power system applications. Briefly, the following 




Figure 1-2: Smart grid application requirements for ICT design. 
 
There are three main trends that will most likely affect the ICT design of smart grids: 1) The 
high penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), and 2) the increased amount of ICT 
devices and data, and 3) The ever-increasing cyber threat that comes with the increased attack 
surface of new interconnected devices. Those trends speak to the need of revising the traditional 
design ICT for smart grids in such a way that the ICT design includes solutions for both the large 
amounts of new data and for the cybersecurity aspect.  This thesis focus on integrating both big 
data analytics and cybersecurity measures for DERs of the future grid. 
1.3 Motivation – The Cyber Threat 
Security is an important aspect of an ICT system design and concerns about incorrect operation 
of (ICT) devices of a smart grid as well as other cyber-physical systems are not new. Those ICT 












cyber-attack [18] and all vectors mentioned here may cause cascaded failures in the electric grid 
with a catastrophic impact on utility assets as well as power interruptions for long periods of time 
[19], [20]. Even though the increase use if ICT on modern power grids allowed enhancement of 
the smart grid in terms of system performance and efficiency [21], [22], from the security 
perspective this trend adds more cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the system [23]. 
 
 
Figure 1-3: Modern trends in electric distribution systems. 
 
At present, the reliability assessment of electric power grid is done under a more holistic 
approach where the contingencies are taken into account not only for the physical power system 
devices but also for the ICT devices as well since their failure may cause serious damages to the 
system [19]. Cyber-attacks have gained a lot of interest from both the research community [5], 
[10], [11] as well as from the electric utilities. Other cyber-physical systems have also been targets 
of cyber-attacks, for instance, the SCADA system of Maroochy Water Services in Australia in 
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year 2000. This water management system was hacked by a former contractor using laptop and a 
radio transmitter in order to take control over 150 pumping stations so he could release untreated 
sewage into storm water drains during a three-month period stealth cyber-attack [24]. In the power 
system umbrella there has been several reported cyber-physical cascading failures such as the 2003 
Italy blackout [25], the 2007 Arizona blackout [11], and the 2011 southwest USA blackout [26], 
just to name a few. From the physical threat angle, it is worth mentioning, the 2014 airborne attack 
on a transmission line from the Quebec power grid where 188,000 customers had no electricity for 
about 2 days [27].  
The first acknowledged cyber-attack on the electric grid happened in Ukraine in 2015, 
where a large part of the Ukrainian power network was affected resulting in power outages for 
several hours where approximately 225,000 customers lost electricity [28]. In 2016 Ukraine 
received another cyber-attack, this time by a malware entitled “CRASHOVERRIDE”, that 
apparently was just a proof of concept cyber-attack [29]. Further, in 2018, a hydro power plant 
circuit breaker malfunctioned resulting in cascading failures and affecting a large part of the 
Brazilian power network with 70 million customers affected. These events may be used as 
examples to emphasize that the extensive use of ICT devices in the modern power systems may 
also unintentionally expose the electric grids to emerging cyber-threats if there is a lack of proper 
security management. 
In recent years, renewable energy sources like wind and solar have been growing 
significantly in the grid and they are expected to grow even more in the future due to sustainability 
goals [30]. The renewable energy sources are mostly non-dispatchable and this inability to 
generate power on demand causes reliability and stability issues to the system. Also, with the 
expected high (in excess of 30%) penetration levels of renewable generation into the system 
demands complex solutions that make use of power electronics as well as more control and 
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monitoring devices and in order to accommodate and coordinate such amounts of renewables into 
the operation of the modern power grid [31], [32]. Fig. 1-4 is a forecast of deployment of 
interconnected ICT devices to different marks in the UK including the utility market [33]. As 
shown in this figure, by the year 2024 (only few years away) the utilities in the UK are expected 
to have around 40 million interconnected ICT devices.  
 
 
Figure 1-4: Forecast of interconnected devices including utilities for the UK market [33]. 
 
Consequently, there will be an increase of use ICT devices in order to enable such high 
penetration levels of renewable sources into the modern grid what is another reason why the 
security aspect of smart grids should receive more importance and cybersecurity measures should 
be integrated to DERs. 
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1.4 Cybersecurity Background 
Every technology may be seen as a two-edged sword where every improvement brings 
benefits to society but may also bring potential negative consequences and even the IEEE`s Code 
of Ethics addresses the double edge nature of technology [34]. Likewise, the smart grid 
improvements bring many advantages to the traditional power system, but they also increase the 
need and use of ICT devices, which increases the interdependency between the power grid and the 
ICT systems, in addition of adding more vulnerabilities such as potential cyber-attacks. For those 
reasons, the security aspect of smart grids becomes an even more important and critical part of 
smart grid`s design. It has been shown that some cyber-attacks have a stealth nature and intrusion 
detection is not a trivial task therefore, intrusion detection is an important security aspect of smart 
grid [35], [36]. 
One of the main important aspects of designing cybersecurity tools is to understand who 
could possibly be responsible for cyber threats, their motivation and how skilled there are. Having 
knowledge about the adversaries may help to develop better cybersecurity tools in terms of attack 
identification and cyber-attacks mitigation [37].  The main adversaries are shown in Fig. 1-5. 
This research has the following assumptions about the attacker model: 
• Any connection at any time could potentially become malicious, even after 
authentication. 
• A highly skilled attacker probably will study the system before attacking in order 
to cause more damaging by hitting critical assets. 





Figure 1-5: Overview of cybersecurity adversaries. 
 
All the monitoring and control of the smart grid is represented through digital data and is 
stored and transmitted from one point to another. In order to make an ICT system more secure 
some requirements are commonly accepted in the literature (Fig. 1-6). The cybersecurity 




Figure 1-6: Cybersecurity requirements. 
 
• Privacy: This requirement refers to protect the utility data from being accessed by 
unauthorized agents. One example of how the lack of this requirement could impact on the smart 
grid would be burglars using smart metering load data to identify when a house is vacant and more 
vulnerable to stealing. 
• Integrity: Refers to the authenticity and accuracy of the data from both monitoring 
and control applications. Since smart grids are comprised by several monitoring and control 
systems the data integrity is very important. If control commands are changed by a hacker, for 
instance, the electrical grid could possibly go unstable or even have cascade failures.  
• Availability: This refers to the data availability in a timely manner. Smart grids have 
large amount of time-sensitive data therefore they should be available according to their latency 
requirements. Operation and protection applications have very stringent latency requirements 
(Please see Table II) consequently if the measurement and/or control signals are not available the 
system may lose synchronization, awareness or even stability.  
The item described above comprise the big picture of cybersecurity requirements for an 





implement all the aforementioned requirements to a system. Since the amount of ICT is extensive 
on smart grids there are many cyber vulnerabilities that may be exploited by attackers. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
This dissertation addresses the four following open problems regarding modern 
distribution systems: 
1) How can we validate an ICT design for future distribution system applications 
considering the new trends? 
2) How can we identify which applications future distribution systems may bring big data 
challenges to such systems? 
3) How can we make the distributed energy resources safer against commonly known 
cyber-attacks using state of the art cybersecurity functionalities? 
1.6 Dissertation Outline  
This dissertation is a compilation of three different research papers. The common theme is the 
ICT design for power distribution networks and distributed energy resources. Each chapter studies 
a different aspect of such design and how it will change with the current trends in modern 
distribution systems. The chapters are organized as follows: 
§ Chapter 2 – Communication System Design for Distributed Energy Resources: All the 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities lie in the cyber part of the system, in other words, they are in 
the ICT part, this speaks to the need of understanding how such systems are designed.  This 
chapter presents the common methodology used for designing ICT system for smart 
distribution grids. It also presents a specific case study of advanced metering infrastructure 
(AMI). The design case study is then modeled and validated through network simulator 3 
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(NS-3). The model presented in this chapter could also be used for testing data analytics 
and cybersecurity features for DERs. 
§ Chapter 3 – Big Data Analytics for Distributed Energy Resources: This chapter initially 
discusses the fundamentals of big data and big data analytics (BDA) and how such topics 
are related to DERs. Then it discusses how the increase of higher order harmonics in 
voltage and current and therefore the need to increase the sampling rate for power quality 
at the distribution level. This trend can quickly escalate exponentially the amount of data 
in the future grid. Even though the amount of available data in the electric grid is increasing 
at an exponential rate and is expected to grow to big data size, BDA may provide several 
opportunities for the monitoring and control of voltage and current harmonics. Effects of 
increasing the sampling rate for monitoring higher order harmonics are discussed. Finally, 
this chapter explores new ideas on BDA for modern distribution systems operation, 
specifically, for PQ analysis and assessment. 
§ Chapter 4 – Recommended Functionalities for Improving Cybersecurity of DERs: The 
legacy electric grid is transitioning into a modern grid with increasing penetration of 
intermittent renewable generation at the distribution side, also known as DERs. Monitoring 
and control of such DERs requires extensive data-exchange and bidirectional 
communication networks. This bidirectional communication paves the way to cyber 
vulnerabilities and risks for new kinds of cyberattacks that may have destructive impacts 
on power system operations. Since IEEE Std. 1547-2018 does not discuss cybersecurity 
measures for DERs, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems 
at all three levels: device level, communications level, and applications level. This chapter 
discusses the current industry’s best practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes 
recommended functionalities for improving the cybersecurity posture of DERs. These 
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practical recommended functionalities have been discussed and verified with the industry 
through a DER cybersecurity working group and are meant to improve the device level 
security of DERs. 
§ Chapter 5 – A Testbed for Validating Electric System Data Cryptography: This chapter 
presents a discussion on two different approaches for emulating real time electric system 
data traffic and how to use this data traffic to test and evaluate cryptography solutions for 
power systems. The trade-offs of each approach is presented and the main objectives of 
such testbed are explained. 
§ Chapter 6 – Conclusion: This chapter summarizes all the findings and outcomes from this 
research. Then it presents the research contributions as well as how they address the 
problem statements from the introduction. 
§ Chapter 7 – Future Work: This chapter briefly describes the future research to be done 













COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DESIGN FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES1 
 
In order to understand how to secure distributed energy resources (DERs), the first step is 
to understand the fundamentals of the information and communication system (ICT) of DERs. All 
the cybersecurity vulnerabilities lie in the cyber part of the system, in other words, they are in the 
ICT part. This requires to the need of understanding how such systems are designed. This chapter 
discusses in detail the approach to design an ICT system for DERs. This helps to understand the 
fundamentals of the cyber vulnerabilities. It also provides a case study of Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) to illustrate such process. The design approach however can be used for 
designing ICT systems for any other DER.  
2.1 Communication System Design:  Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Overview 
The modern electric grid integrates the existing power system infrastructure with an ICT 
network allowing for improvements of the system in terms of efficiency, reliability, resiliency and 
flexibility [16], [38]. The definition of smart grid is adopted from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) that includes the increased use of digital information and 
controls technology in the power system [17].  
                                                   
1 This Chapter is a slightly modified and updated version of the original paper [65] by R. Siqueira de 
Carvalho, P. K Sen, Y. Nag Velaga, L. Feksa Ramos, and L. Neves Canha, “Communication System Design for an 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure,” Sensors , vol. 18, no. 11. 2018. 
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Since the amount of data and control in the modern power grid is increasing rapidly as it 
becomes more mature, the interdependency between the cyber and physical systems increases as 
well. The ICT network design for smart power applications becomes a more critical task [14]. In 
the past few years, several surveys have been published addressing the smart grid applications and 
its communication requirements as well as the ICT technologies [8]. Reference [17] provides a 
comprehensive overview of the design process of the ICT layer of a smart grid.  
 





However, due to the complexity, the design and implementation of the ICT network is still 
a very challenging task. Different power utilities across the globe have different power network 
characteristics as well as different geographical features and operational philosophy. It is difficult, 
if not impossible to have a single generalized design process that fits all power systems [4]. It is 
worth mentioning the related AMI work from reference [39] but this research differs by following 
the information model provided by IEC Std. 61968. 
The design process depends on the specific features and requirements. Case studies are 
valuable process for such design tasks. This research performs a case study of an ICT network for 
an AMI using the Network Simulator 3 (NS-3) software [40] and deployed on the IEEE 34 node 
radial distribution test network shown in Figure 2-1 [41]. The distribution feeder is very long and 
lightly loaded at a 24.9 kV nominal voltage and little over 2,000 kVA load. A PLC model library 
provided in Reference [42] is also utilized. 
2.2 Materials and Methods 
2.2.1 Communication Network Design Process 
A communication network design process similar to the one proposed in [17] is adopted 
here because its methodology is tailored to power system applications. The simple flowchart in 
Figure 2-2 summarizes the process: 
 














• (a) Smart Grid Application Requirements: The first step is to determine what 
applications and functionalities are required. Each application has different needs in terms of 
reliability, security, and performance that collectively comprise the quality of service requirements 
(QoS). In addition, the communication engineer should also consider physical constraints related 
to the terrain and device locations as well as the available budget.  
• (b) Network Traffic Estimation: The next step is to identify all sources of data traffic. 
Each source of data may have different sizes of packets.  It is necessary to list all possible data 
packet sizes and how frequent they are generated. The size of the data traffic depends on the 
information model of each application. Table 2-1 summarizes some of the main communication 
protocols for different smart grid applications. Once all the traffic data types, sizes, and sources 
are known then the total network traffic estimation is computed to determine the data rate and 
latency allowed. 
• (c) Physical and Logical Network Design: The third step is to determine the physical 
location of each ICT device. The maximum distance between the ICT devices and what type of 
physical barriers may exist between them influences the decision for the best communication 
technologies. The communication technology (or combination of technologies) is determined 
including the best location forming the topology of the communication network. Reference [43] 
provide a good summary of the main trade-offs between the commonly used communication 
technologies for smart grids. 
• (d) Network Design Validation: There are two approaches to validate a communication 
network. (i) First, by running actual experiments with real hardware in the physical location or in 
a location with similar features as the target location, or (ii) second, by running computer 
simulations and using communication models that give an approximation of real-world 
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performances. Actual experiments are more accurate, but they are expensive and time-consuming. 
It is a common practice, validation is done through computer simulations. Some of the 
communication network simulators mostly used for smart grid applications include the Network 
Simulator 3 (NS-3), OMNet++, and OPNET [44]. Each simulator has its advantages and 
disadvantages, and that discussion is beyond the scope of this research. A thorough discussion on 
both the communication and power simulators commonly used for smart grid studies has been 
presented in Reference [38]. 
• (e) Verification: The final step is to ensure that the network design meets the minimum 
application requirements (or specification) in terms of QoS. If the design does not meet the needs, 
then a redesign is done in order to meet the minimum application requirements. 
 
Table 2-1 The power system communication protocols 
Application Communication Protocols 
Tele-Protection Relays IEC 60834 or IEEE C37.236 
Substation Automation IEC 61850 
Transmission Automation IEC 60870-5 or DNP3 
Synchrophasors IEEE C37.118.1 
AMI IEC 61968 
Demand Response (DR) IEC 61968 
DER Control IEC 61850 
 
2.2.2 Case Study Details 
In the legacy system, the electricity usage is measured locally through an induction-disc 
electromechanical energy meter. Some utility personnel are responsible for reading and recording 
those measurements that would be used later for billing purposes. AMI is a bi-directional data 
communication system that allows for the gathering of energy consumption measurements 
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digitally from electricity customer and sending it to the utility. Additionally, AMI enables demand 
response (DR) programs, time of day metering, and net metering, among other features [39]. The 
following subsections expand the design steps for the AMI case study proposed in this research. 
2.2.2.1 AMI Application Requirements 
Each smart grid AMI application has different requirements in terms of reliability, 
bandwidth, and latency. The minimum requirements for some of the common applications are 
available in Reference [16]. For the AMI case, the minimum data rate is 56 kbps and the maximum 
latency is 2 s [16]. However, it is a good practice to design a communication network based on the 
network traffic estimation that may have more stringent requirements. 
The standard communication protocol for AMI, IEC Std. 61968, specifies the information 
model as well as which network protocols may be used, and it also specifies that the messages 
between the communication nodes should be done using the extensible markup language (XML) 
[45]. This network protocol is adopted in this design for the messages between the substation and 
the smart meters. 
2.2.2.2 AMI Network Traffic Estimation  
In order to simulate and test the communication scheme, it is necessary to have the load 
profile for each smart meter. Since the IEEE 34 node feeder is located in Arizona, USA, a typical 
daily load profile of an average residence from Phoenix, Arizona, available from the OpenEI 
database is used. For simplicity and proof of concept, the same profile shown in Figure 2-3 is used 





Figure 2-3: The daily load profile used as the input for all smart meters. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: An example of the XML load measurement from a smart meter. 
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The information model used for structuring the load measurement is based on the IEC Std. 
61968 where all the measurement information is structured in one XML file with each type of 
information categorized by an XML tag as shown in Figure 2-4.  
Each measurement from the smart meters follows the above model. The presentation layer of 
the open systems interconnection (OSI) model is chosen to be UTF-8 that uses one-byte encoding. 
Every character symbol in the information model adds one byte to the total size of the packet. 
Every measurement message has 381 characters and, therefore, 381 bytes. The total network traffic 
estimation can be given by the summation of all data from all data sources: 
Network	Traffic	Estimation = 3 (PS7 + OS7);<=> × 𝑁𝐷𝑆<, (2.1) 
 
where, PS and OS are the payload size and overhead size of a given data source, and NDS is the 
number of data sources for a given application. It is common for smart grids to have multiple 
applications and multiple types of data sources. However, this project considered only an AMI 
application. Table 2-2 outlines the network traffic estimation for this project that is 128,370 bytes. 
This is the total amount of data flowing in the communication network during every measurement 
interval. The interval for AMI according to IEC Std. 61968 is between 15 to 60 min, depending 
on the utility. In this design, the interval is chosen to be 60 min due to the public dataset used that 
had hourly granularity. 
Table 2-2 The communication network traffic estimation. 
AMI Network Traffic Estimation 
Payload Size (PS) 381 Bytes 
PLC Overhead Size (OS) 8 Bytes 
Total Measurement Size 389 Bytes 
Number of Smart Meters (NDS) 330 Units 




2.2.2.3. AMI Communication Network Design—Choosing the ICT Technology 
With a network traffic estimation of 128,370 bytes per hour, the majority of technologies 
available such as Power Line Carrier (PLC), IEEE Std. 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE Std. 802.11 (Wi-
Fi), or fiber optics could easily handle this data rate [43]. In this research project, each one of the 
data concentrators is physically located at each transformer and based on the physical topology, 
the longest section between the transformers is around 11 km. Due to the long distance, it is 
possible to eliminate many technology options that are meant for distances shorter than 11 km 
such as IEEE Std. 802.15.4 and IEEE Std. 802.11 [43]. The technology options that have physical 
range capabilities greater than 11 km area are IEEE Std. 802.16 (WiMAX), Fiber, or narrowband 
PLC. Among the three technologies, PLC is the one with the lowest cost since it utilizes the 
existing power line as the communication medium avoiding higher installation costs when 
compared to fiber and WiMAX [43]. 
The data rate of narrowband PLC ranges from 5 to 500 kbps [46]. The data rate is set to 
130 kbps in order to leave room for scalability. The modulation technique choice is binary phase 
shift keying (BPSK) due to its inherent reliability. The medium access control (MAC) algorithm 
is carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA). That is, the MAC 
algorithm is specified by the IEEE Std. P1901.2 which is the Std. for narrowband PLC [46]. 
2.2.2.4 AMI Cyber Security 
AMI like any other smart grid application devices is exposed to cyber threats. The two 
major cyber-attacks targeting AMI systems are: (a) hackers aiming to gain access to confidential 
data from customers so they can infer the house scheduled based on the load profile, so one may 
plan a robbery based on such information, and (b) customers may hack and change the energy 
22 
 
usage data  to reduce their energy bills as a form of energy theft [47]. Thus far, several cyber-
security measures for AMI have been proposed in the literature [48], however, since cyber-security 
is not the main focus of this research, those measures were not implemented here. Nevertheless, 
cyber-security is a very important part of the smart grid communication design. 
2.2.2.5 PLC Network System Modeling 
The PLC communication network is modeled using the C++ and the NS-3 simulator. The 
electrical model for overhead lines, transformers, and other electric devices as well as the channel 
model is developed in [42]. This is the base for building the physical electric model. As mentioned 
earlier, 330 smart meters deployed in the low voltage (LV) system and each meter is connected to 
one of the 33 data concentrators located in the high voltage (HV) side of each distribution 
transformers. Each data concentrator gathers the hourly load data from the controller located in the 
substation and pulls all the measurement data. The information gathered at the substation controller 
may be used later for both billing purposes and for demand response programs. Each data 
concentrator is capable of transmitting data at 130 kbps with binary phase shift keying (BPSK) 
modulation and carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) as the medium 
access control protocol in order to make shared medium communication possible. 
In this design, the transport and network layers are not used because they would increase the 
overhead size of the data traffic without adding relevant benefits since the computer network only 
has 33 data concentrators and one substation controller. The smart meter device models developed 
here mimic the behavior of real smart meters by sending hourly power measurements whenever 
the substation sends metering requests. Table 2-3 summarizes all the simulation parameters for the 




Table 2-3 The simulation parameters 
Protocol Layer Parameter Value 
Application 
Packet Size 381 Bytes 




Session Not Using - 
Transport Not Using - 
Network Not Using - 
Data Link and 
MAC  
Medium Access Control CSMA/CA 
Physical 
Modulation Technique BPSK 
Chanel Bit Rate 130 kbps 
Transmitted Power 1 Watt 
Receiver Sensitivity 100 mW 




The main objective of the simulation is to measure the total delay of every single smart 
meter measurement by using the propagation model and a MAC protocol. In order to count how 
many measurements are received at the substation and to calculate the signal to noise ratio the PLC 
receiver modem sensitivity is set to −20 dBm (typical value). The communication signal is 
transmitted from the data concentrators to the substation with the transmission power set to 1 W  
(typical value) and it arrives at the receiver with some signal attenuation due to fading over the 
overhead lines. If the received signal has less than 100 mW power, the receiver is not able to 





2.3 Results  
2.3.1 NS-3 Simulation Results 
The ICT model is simulated for a period of 24 h. The global end-to-end delay between 
every smart meter and controller at the substation is measured totaling 7,920 measurement packets. 
Figure 2-5 depicts the delay results of all packets, both the smart measurement packets as well as 
additional control messages from the CSMA/CA algorithm used in the MAC sublayer. The total 
number of messages is over 15,000. The maximum delay is 0.9991 s. All the measurement delays 
were below 2 s, which is above the recommended communication requirements for AMI. 
 




From the simulation results seen in Figure 2-5 it reveals that all measurement cycles have the 
same maximum measured delay of 0.9991 s due to the fact that the number of measurements in 
every hour is the same and the CSMA/CA algorithm is used so there is no random component to 
the total end-to-end delay. Additionally, the ICT network is idle during the majority of time 
throughout the day since all measurements are gathered at the beginning of every hour then there 
are no messages being transmitted in the ICT network until the following hour. Further, the 
measurements cycles were scheduled to start on the first second of every hour so there is an equal 
spacing between the delay “spikes”.  
 




Figure 2-6 shows more details about the global end-to-end delay in the first measurement 
cycle that last for less than 4 s. In this figure the global end-to-end delay curve has a line shape 
due to the fact that the CSMA/CA algorithm creates a first come first serve queue of all 
measurements to be sent through the PLC network since it only allows one communication node 
to use the shared medium at a given time, then the global delay increases proportionally to the 
number of messages to be sent at the same time. If CSMA/CD or some other MAC algorithm with 
collision detection was issued instead, this delay plot would have a stochastic component instead 
as well as likely packet collisions.  
Another aspect of the delay plot is that there are four lines for one measurement cycle as seen 
from Figure 2-6. This is because a time multiplexing scheme is used for reducing the delay where 
the total 330 smart meters are split into three groups made up of 80 smart meters and one group 
comprising of 90 smart meters. Besides time multiplexing two other options for reducing the delay 
in this research are frequency multiplexing and the increase of transmission data rate. Both options 
may be added later if the number of smart meters increases in the future for the sake of scalability. 
Additionally, all the 7,920 measurement packets were received at the substation node with a 100% 
availability and the average global end-to-end delay is about 0.5 s. Finally, the minimum measured 
delay is 0.02393 s. Table 2-4 summarizes the main simulation results. 
 
Table 2-4 Simulation results 
Result Measured Std. Requirement 
Min. Delay 0.02393 s 2 s (max.) 
Max. Delay 0.9991 s 2 s (max.) 
Average Delay 0.5 s 2 s (max.)  
Data Rate 130 kbps 56 kbps  




2.3.2 Numerical Analysis and Model Validation 
In order to validate the NS-3 simulation results, the research utilized the end-to-end delay 
numerical analysis from reference [49]. This is calculated as 
End to end Delay (d) = Queuing Delay (𝑑DEFEG;H) + Transmission Delay 
(𝑑IJK;LMGLLGN;)  + Propagation Delay (𝑑OJNOKHKIGN;), 
(2.2) 
where the Queuing Delay depends on both the network topology and the MAC algorithm 
(CSMA/CA in this case) and is not trivial to compute. For a single data frame when the channel is 




The Propagation Delay depends on the path length and on the propagation velocity that has 
been assumed to be close to the speed of light (approximately 3 × 108 m/s): 
𝑑OJNOKHKIGN; =	 `KIa	bF;HaI`JNOKHKIGN;	cFdNeGIf  (2.4) 
The end-to-end delay of 1 data frame in the link between the node 802 and the substation 
node (node 800) has been compared with the measured delay from the NS-3 simulation. In this 
case, since the channel is free there is no Queuing Delay, therefore, 𝑑DEFEG;H = 0	𝑠. The frame 
size is 389 bytes (3,112 bits) and the channel capacity is 130,000 bits/s. The distance between 
nodes 800 and 802 is 786 m [10] and the propagation velocity is assumed to be the same as the 
speed of light. Using Equation (2.2) the calculated End-to-end Delay for this case will be 
28 
 
𝑑 = 	0 + 3,112	𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
130,000 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠
+ 786	𝑚3x10r𝑚𝑠
= 	0.02393	 + 	0.0000026, 
d = 0.0239326 s 
 
which is close to the simulated value of 0.02393 s. From the numerical analysis, it can be noticed 
that the main component of the delay is the Transmission Delay, in this case. 
2.4  Conclusion 
This research presents a narrowband PLC communication design and an analysis for an 
AMI application deploying 330 smart meters along the IEEE 34 bus distribution network. This is 
modeled in Network Simulator 3 (NS-3) and is compared with the communication network 
performance requirements for AMI. The network traffic is 285.26 bits per second, which is 
considered to be very low when compared to state-of-the-art communication technologies. The 
simulation results show that the proposed communication network meets the minimum 
requirements and the following lessons are learned: 
 a) Among all communication technologies applicable to modern power systems there 
is no one “best” technology. Each technology has its pros and cons and the communication 
engineer should look for the options that meet all the project requirements and the design criteria 
at a minimum cost. Additionally, the ICT design could be a combination of two or more ICT 
technologies. This is usually the case for smart grids with large geographical areas and/or multiple 
applications. 
 b) PLC communication has proven to be a cost-effective solution for this AMI 
application with scope for further scalability without changing the ICT network. The network 
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design steps proposed here are generic and relevant regardless of the different project requirements 
that may be used for other smart grid applications. 
 c) When there are multiple applications for a smart grid, it is necessary to assign 
different priorities to different applications. For instance, if an ICT network is being used for both 
AMI and tele-protection applications then the ICT network should prioritize all messages from 
tele-protection because it is a more critical application.  
 d) The network traffic of a single smart meter in this study is 0.86 bits per second. 
When compared to other smart grid applications this traffic is considered very low. For instance, 
IEEE Std. C37.118.2 for synchrophasor data points that a phasor measurement unit (PMU) with 
60 Hz sampling generates 23,040 bits per second which is much higher than a smart meter data 
rate. Based on those numbers more than 26,000 smart meters would be necessary to generate the 
same amount of data of a single PMU. Because of this reason, smart metering is not among the 






BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 
 
The electric grid, as we know today, is changing at a fast pace and is expected to have high 
penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) and more non-linear loads at the distribution 
and customer level. This introduces several challenges to the monitoring and control of the 
distribution network. One such challenge is to address the significant increase of higher order 
harmonics (h) in voltage and current. At present, power quality (PQ) meters have sampling rate 
limitations and cannot detect high order harmonics. The amount of available data in the electric 
grid is also increasing at an exponential rate and is expected to grow to big data size. Big Data 
Analytics (BDA) may provide several opportunities for the monitoring and control of voltage and 
current harmonics. Effects of increasing the sampling rate for monitoring higher order harmonics 
are discussed here, and this chapter explores new ideas on BDA for modern distribution systems 
operation, specifically, for Power Quality (PQ) analysis and assessment. 
3.1 Introduction 
PQ encompasses a variety of issues including (but not limited to). harmonics including 
sub- and supra-harmonics, switching transients, voltage unbalance, voltage flicker, voltage swell 
and sag, and power interruptions. Maintaining all aspects of electric PQ within operational limits 
is an extremely difficult and challenging task and is very important for future grid operations to 
ensure both compatibility, resiliency and proper operation of electric loads. One of the current 
trends for the future grid is the high penetration of non-linear loads (including LED technology 
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and all sorts of power electronics (PE) devices).  The high penetration of power electronics 
interfaced renewable and DERs such as solar photovoltaics (PV), battery storage and electric 
vehicles (EV) [50]–[54] are all adding to the problem.  These types of loads and resources 
contribute to the distortion of the current and voltage waveforms and also introduce challenges for 
smart grid operation and PQ management [55]–[59]. For harmonics, it is defined in the IEEE Std. 
519.  For voltage flicker, it is defined in IEEE Std. 1453. For interconnection standard, IEEE Std. 
1547-2018 has been accepted by the industry. However, as the smart grid evolves, so does the need 
to capture additional metrics related to PQ.  
The nature of power system short circuit level (i.e. fault current) is another important aspect 
of PQ. It is well known that a strong grid with a high short circuit level is an indication of a robust 
system in terms of voltage PQ. However, the future electric grid is expected to have high 
penetration levels of DERs, EVs and other power electronics interfaces thereby reducing the fault 
currents. This also leads to increased voltage fluctuations and unbalance conditions in the 
distribution feeders [55]. DERs and EV charging stations based on inverters may generate both 
low order harmonics (harmonic order (h) < 50) and higher order harmonics between 2 to 150 kHz 
(h ˃ 50) as noticed in Fig. 3-1. This has created more attention in the PQ research community [56], 
[59], [60]. The term supraharmonics is used to describe harmonics in the range of 2 kHz - 150 kHz 
and it has recently gained popularity [56], [61]. However, the most commonly used guidelines like 
IEEE Std. 519 only recommends monitoring of current harmonics up to the 50th order (h < 50) 
[62] and the majority of PQ meter devices can only detect harmonics up to the 64th order (h < 64) 
[63]. Thus, it is very hard to monitor and control higher order harmonics since they cannot be 




Figure 3-1: Supraharmonics emission from modern loads and DERs [64]. 
 
The information and communication technologies (ICT) sector are also facing radical 
changes, and those technologies are shifting to the big data era where large amounts of data are 
available from the different system including smart grids [65]. The power systems industry is also 
following this ICT trend and shifting to the big data space as well [66]. With large amounts of data 
available, i.e. big data, data science tools become more powerful and could eventually be used to 
optimize smart grid operations. Modern ICT has very high sampling rate capabilities for PQ 
metering which allow for the detection of higher order current harmonics (h ˃ 50). Furthermore, 
BDA could be used to improve PQ monitoring and control in terms of sub-harmonics, harmonics, 
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and supraharmonics (9 kHz-150 kHz) as well as inter-harmonics. This paper explores BDA and 
how it connects smart grids and PQ analysis and assessment. A discussion on how increasing the 
sampling rate of PQ metering may impact the total amount of data for smart grids is presented in 
this Chapter. Further, it summarizes some of the applications and proposes ideas on BDA for PQ 
analysis. 
3.2 Big Data Analytics, Data Science, Engineering and Power Quality 
3.2.1 Big Data Analytics (BDA) and Power Quality (PQ) 
There are several definitions of BDA and its associated fields. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) created a working group called Big Data Working Group 
(BDWG) to establish a common terminology. BDA is the use of data science for applications with 
very large amounts of data (popularly called big data), and this has been well received in academia, 
industry, and government [67]. BDA primarily focuses on four attributes of the datasets which are 
volume, velocity, variety, and variability also known as the “4-Vs” depicted in Fig. 3-2. Future 
electric utility industry and the growth of smart grid, the PQ applications have rapidly increased 
to the big data level. 
(a) Data Volume refers to the quantity of data. In the electric power industry, the volume of data 
generated and stored is increasing exponentially [68]. As an example, modern electric grids have 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) for collecting data.  There are approx. 130 million meters 
in USA, and the increased number of clients having AMI has elevated the volume of data. The 





Figure 3-2: Big Data and Its Characteristics. 
 
 (b) Data Velocity is defined as the rate in which data is transmitted and received. In power 
systems, an example of equipment with high data velocity are phasor measurement units (PMUs). 
Legacy PMUs have sampling rates up to one sample per second, but future PMUs are expected to 
have multiple sample rates per second [69].  PQ meters also have high sampling rates to observe 
current and voltage waveforms (usually 128 samples per cycle). Even higher sampling rates may 
be required in the future. 
(c) Data Variety refers to the number of different sources used to measure data. For instance, 
modern electric grids now monitor temperature for various devices like power transformers, 
transmission and distribution line conductors and capacitor banks to evaluate their lifecycle and 
replacement strategy and asset management; gas pressures, temperature, humidity, dielectric 
values; breakers and relay status and many operations, other sensors, etc. The addition of these 
new types of measurements increases the variety of power system data. PQ monitoring and control 
devices also increase data variety. 
Volume











(d) Data Variability describes the changes in a dataset rather than a change in the data itself. Data 
variability is also related to the need for dynamic scaling to efficiently handle the additional 
computational processing. One example of dynamic scaling is variable sampling for PMUs and 
PQ meters or other devices where the continuous sampling rate is lower in resolution when 
compared to the sampling rate compared to the transient system events. 
Another research effort in defining attributes of big data is from the IEEE Smart Grid Big 
Data Group [70]. They have also included an additional item called “value” which refers to gaining 
useful information or “value” out of a dataset using data science [67]. According to the NIST 
definition “value” is one of the characteristics of data science. 
3.2.2 Data Science for Power Quality 
NIST defines data science as the intersection of statistics, data mining (DM), machine 
learning (ML) and software engineering. Alternately, data science is the analytical techniques used 
to extract knowledge directly from data [67]. DM and ML are distinct categories of methods used 
in data science. ML can be defined by some method that gives computers the ability to learn 
without being “explicitly programmed’’ [71]. On the other hand, DM is one of the steps of a 
Knowledge Discovery Database (KDD), but DM sometimes is used as a synonym for KDD. A key 
difference between ML and DM is that DM methods incorporate prior knowledge unlike ML [71]. 
There are numerous artificial intelligence (AI) techniques that can be applied to power systems. 
DM methods, on the other hand, can also be categorized as (a) classification, (b) regression, 





Figure 3-3: Sample of ML algorithms. 
 
ML algorithms based on their desired outputs can be categorized by (as shown in Fig. 3-
4). All the different DM and ML techniques could potentially be used for extracting value for PQ 
analysis. 
(a) Classification: The objective is to predict categorical labels of new input data based on past 
classifications from historical data. For instance, historical patterns of AMI hacked data, and 
healthy AMI data could be used in binary classification to predict whether or not a smart meter 
has been hacked. Also, it is possible that the data is classified into more than two possibilities 
called a Multiclass Classification.  
(b) Regression: Usually based on statistical analysis, this method uses historical data input to 
develop a model to predict one or more output variables. Regression methods are used for 
forecasting load, weather conditions, renewable energy generation or even electricity pricing in 










(c) Clustering: Clustering techniques organize data into subgroups or clusters. One example of 
clustering used in power system is load profiling clustering for electricity pricing.  
(d) Summarization: This type of method provides a compact description for a subset of data. If 
there are a lot of redundant variables, summarization techniques could be used to reduce the 
amount of data in both transmission and storage, therefore alleviating big data issues. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Sample of ML algorithms by objectives. 
(e) Association: Describes dependencies and association relationships among different attributes. 
There are many variables in power systems which may be correlated to specific outcomes, e.g., 






























(f) Sequence Analysis: Focuses on finding sequential patterns in data sets. This could be useful for 
post mortem analysis of cascade failures to identify critical assets to the electric grid. 
3.2.3 Big Data Engineering: Necessary Tools for Future PQ 
The state-of-the-art ICT may not be enough to achieve monitoring and control applications 
for smart grids when dealing with large amounts of data [73]. Gathering, transmitting, processing 
and storing big data creates ongoing challenges for smart grids such as interoperability, scalability, 
missing data, limited network capacity, and cybersecurity. The term “Big Data Engineering” may 
be used to define the engineering system aspects which handles large amounts of data [67]. There 
are several potential solutions to big data engineering which consist of the following tools (Fig. 3-
5): 
 
Figure 3-5: Necessary tools for a BDA framework for PQ applications. 
















a) Data Acquisition and Pre-processing: Before the collected data is used, it is possible that 
some data are missing or inaccurate. To mitigate those issues, data cleaning techniques are used to 
identify and possibly fix such errors. 
(b) Data Compression: This is the process of reducing the size of the original dataset and 
compressing it down into a much smaller dataset while still retaining the necessary information 
from the original. It can be either lossy compression or lossless compression. In lossless design, 
compression does not lead to any loss in data. In lossy compression, however, losses some minimal 
information may happen. As a trade-off, lossy compression can increase both network 
performance in terms of bandwidth, throughput, and latency as well as data storage efficiency [74], 
[75].  
(c) Parallel Processing: The concept of parallel computing is to divide a complex 
computational problem into smaller ones that will be solved by each processor in a group of several 
processors [76]. 
(d) Cloud Computing:  A system used for enabling ubiquitous, on-demand network access 
to a shared pool of computing resources including data storage, remote processing and remote 
applications that can be easily provisioned through service provider interaction [76].  
(e) Dynamic Scaling/Sampling: Dynamic sampling is a way of scaling down the number 
of samples per time of a monitoring device when it is at steady state and but increases the sampling 
to its maximum in the case of an event or change of state.  
(f) Cyber Security: As the electric grid and PQ evolve into the big data space, so does the 
need and use of ICT systems. The increased use of ICT systems increases the interdependency 
between the power and cyber parts as well as the attack surface for potential cyber-attacks [65].  
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Because of those reasons, it is very important that future PQ applications have cybersecurity 
measures to identify and mitigate cyber threats.  
Besides the big data engineering tools, it is important to emphasize that smart grids already 
have standards and requirements to ensure interoperability between different devices, minimum 
quality standards for monitoring and control applications, design scalability, minimum reliability 
and security [65]. To achieve the minimum smart grid requirements, the applications should follow 
ICT standards for smart grid connectivity. The main institutions developing smart grid 
interconnection standards are IEC and IEEE. The ICT standard for PQ communication is IEEE 
Std. 1159 [77] which proposes recommendations on how data for PQ purposes should be 
monitored, collected, transmitted and stored. The standard has been revised to account for the 
evolution of PQ in the modern grid.  However, this also should be further revised in the future to 
account for PQ in a scenario with high penetration of DERs and EVs as well an electric grid with 
large amounts of available data. 
3.3 Exploring Big Data Sources in Power Quality 
With the recent trend in the topic of BDA and smart grid, there is a relevant question that 
is not fully answered: What constitutes the big data accumulation in power systems? [65] Fig 3-6 
illustrates the key reasons for the increase of the data volume from smart grid applications. But the 
main reason why PQ data accumulation could increase exponentially is due to the need to increase 
in the monitoring of higher-order harmonics. 
3.3.1 Harmonic Monitoring Range for PQ Meters and Devices 
An alternating non-sinusoidal non-periodic current may be defined as:  




where, 𝑖u is the fundamental component and 𝑖JFL	  is residual component. Note that, 𝑖JFL	 contains 
dc, integer and non-integer multiple of the fundamental component. According to the Std. IEEE 
1159 the current harmonics in a system should be monitored in the range between 0 to 9 kHz (150th 
harmonic) for 60Hz systems [77]. So, the current will be given by: 




where, the subscript h represents the order of harmonics, ih(t) is the total harmonic currents, βh is 
an arbitrary phase angle for harmonic h, and Ih is the rms value of the h order harmonic. However, 
it is common to find PQ monitoring devices which only monitor current harmonics up to the 50th 
order. So, the current will be given by: 




where, h represents harmonic up to 50th order. As discussed earlier the non-linear loads such as 
LEDs and modern power electronics devices generate harmonics in 2kHz to 9kHz range. Also, 
EVs and inverter based DERs inject high order current harmonics in the same order as well. 
Therefore, there is a need for modern PQ monitoring devices to increase the range of current 
harmonic monitoring up to 150th order. In addition to the current harmonics, many modern electric 
loads generate harmonics in the range of 9kHz to 150kHz, called “supraharmonics.”  In that case, 
the current will be given by: 




where, s is the order of supraharmonics. 
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Further, power systems may also have inter-harmonics (non-integer multiples of the 
fundamental), that may be defined as: 





where, i is the order of interharmonics. 
Eq. (3.1) can be rewritten as (assuming there is no dc component): 
𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑖u(𝑡) + 𝑖JFL(𝑡) = 𝑖u(𝑡) + 𝑖a(𝑡) + 𝑖Ga(𝑡) + 𝑖La(𝑡), (3.6) 
𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑖	u + √2w𝐼a sin(ℎ𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽a)
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where, 𝑖	u = √2𝐼{ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜔𝑡 + 𝛽{). Eq. (3.7) takes into account harmonics from the electric grid with 
a high penetration level of non-linear loads, EVs and DERs. Compared to Eq. (3.2), it can be seen 
that Eq. (3.7) requires a considerable larger sampling rate which leads to a significant increase in 
both data velocity and volume for PQ meter devices. This is one of the biggest reasons why BDA 
has an important role, not only in the smart grid, but also in the area of assessing PQ monitoring 
and control. 
3.3.2 Minimum Sampling Rate for Supraharmonic Monitoring – A Simple Example 
The IEEE Std. 1159.3 defines the information model for PQ Data Interchange Format 
(PQDIF). The PQDIF combines raw monitoring data, processed, simulated, calculated data and 
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even other observations regarding PQ events into a complex hierarchical file [77]. The size of a 
PQDIF file not only depends on the sampling rate of the PQ monitor device, but also on the 
duration of each PQ event and number of recorded PQ observations. Therefore, it is not a trivial 
task to estimate the size of a PQDIF file.  
The IEEE Std. 1159.3 does not recommend a minimum sampling rate. Rather it focuses on 
how PQ data is structured and stored in a binary file.  It is very common to find PQ monitors with 
a sampling rate of 128 measurements per cycle (16.67msec for the 60Hz system) [63] that allow 
monitoring of harmonics up to the 64th order (according to the Nyquist-Shannon sampling criteria) 
regardless of the system frequency. This is why the IEEE Std. 519 recommends monitoring and 
control of harmonics up to the 50th order. To monitor harmonics up to the 2,500th order, the 
minimum sampling rate has to be 5,000 measurements per cycle, or 300kHz for a 60Hz system 
(Table 3-1). That rate is up to 40 times higher than the current de facto sampling rates for PQ 
meters. 
 
















128 7,680 Hz 3,840 Hz 64th 
5,000 300,000 Hz 150,000 Hz 2,500th 
 
The size of a PQDIF file also depends on several factors including the encoding technique, 
the event duration and number of PQ observations [77]. So, simulation and/or experiments are 
needed to have an accurate number of how much the data will increase when the sampling rate of 
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a PQ meter is increased to 5,000 samples per cycle. However, from Table 3-1, it is possible to 
observe that the number of samples per window of monitoring will increase more than 3,900%, 
which is a significant increase in raw recorded PQ data. Since a linear relationship between the 
size of a PQDIF file and the sampling rate can be assumed, it can be observed how quickly the 
amount of data volume from a PQ meter can escalate if supraharmonics monitoring and control 
become a new standard for the future grid. 
3.3.3 Using Smart Grid Data for PQ Monitoring and Control 
Traditionally, data collected for PQ analytics came exclusively from PQ monitoring 
devices.  Other power systems applications have different data needs. For example, some require 
only monitoring while others may also require control. Different applications have different 
requirements in terms of data rate, security, and latency [44]. Nowadays, data collection for PQ 
studies may come from data sources, such as PQ monitors, protective relays, smart meters, control 
devices, weather data, DER devices, historical data, synchro-phasors, PMUs and many other 
intelligent electronic devices (IED). All the smart grid data sources may be used and combined for 
PQ applications (Fig. 3-6). Some of the data sources are briefly discussed below. 
 




(a) Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): Allows automated energy and power 
measurements among other features, including demand response. AMI can be combined with other 
technologies such as getaways, smart inverters and it may also have enough sampling resolution 
to provide data for PQ and microgrid management. They usually have low resolution and data rate 
for economic reasons.  
(b) Phasor Measurements Units (PMU’s): The PMUs measure both voltage and current 
from different points in the systems for power system operation and planning. Data sampling rates 
of 60 Hz and higher make them a great source. Traditionally they were found mostly in the 
generation and transmission part (or bulk energy system), but now-a-days they are also being 
deployed in the distribution system as well. This is already creating havoc in data input. 
(c) Tele-Protection: Data from this application is used to operate very fast protective relays 
and uses high-speed communication channels. It may also be used for PQ purposes. 
(d) Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs): IEDs is any device or sensors (like temperature 
monitoring, breaker status, pressure, etc.) in both transmission and distribution system that has 
communication capabilities.  
(e) Weather Data: With the high penetration of distributed renewable energy sources it is 
important to be able to forecast the power generation from such sources to avoid and mitigate PQ 
issues. 
(f) Instrument Transformers and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA): This is extensively used in the legacy system but has a very low sampling rate.  
However, the number of such devices in the system is huge. 
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(g) PQ Monitoring: It has a very high sampling rate compared to AMI and PMUs the 
sampling rate may be higher than hundreds of kHz to detect high-frequency voltage and current 
harmonics in the grid. Because of the very high sampling rate, the amount of data per PQ 
monitoring unit is a lot higher than any other application. 
PQ data can also be categorized differently like local data, system data, or estimated data. 
The main PQ data types are: 
(a) Operational data which represents apparent power flow, voltage and current level, and 
robustness of the system.  
(b) Key data about system security and energy quality.  
(c) Data related to energy consumption, such as load profile and maximum demand.  
(d) Data from power system events, such as interruption, loss of load or generation or 
information about system faults.  
(e) Metadata used to organize and extract information from another type of raw data. 
3.4 BDA Applications in PQ Assessment 
There are many articles discussing the challenges and opportunities of big data and BDA 
for the future electric grid [73], [78], [79]. This Chapter focuses on the challenges and opportunities 
of BDA for PQ. Regarding applications involving BDA for PQ, so far there are very few 
experimental data available in the literature. It is worth mentioning the relevant work in reference 
[80] where a big data framework for the analysis of synchronized harmonics in a distribution 
system is developed. Despite the challenges of handling big amounts of data, recent advances in 
BDA provide more opportunities for PQ management. Fig. 3-7 illustrates a composite picture 
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illustrating the scope. It shows the connectivity between the related quantities and analytical 
techniques. 
 
Figure 3-7: Proposed framework for using BDA for PQ monitoring and analysis. 
 
Some of the key features are: 
(a) Traditional analysis and reporting of PQ examine harmonics up to the 50th order. 
Modern ICT combined with BDA for PQ monitoring may allow voltage and current monitoring at 
much higher sampling rates as compared to current monitoring devices. This approach may be 
used for monitoring the supraharmonics up to the 2,500th order as well as monitoring the intra-
harmonics, which are also significant in the future grid with high penetration of EVs, DERs, and 
modern electronics.  
(b) Big data fusion techniques could be used to combine data from PQ monitoring devices 
with data from other smart grid applications. These techniques could be used to obtain a more 
accurate snapshot of the electric grid states and variables of interest for continually PQ monitoring. 
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(c) BDA techniques based on ML have also been successfully used in detecting energy 
thefts [81]. Non-technical losses are indirectly related to PQ since they may overload the electric 
grid assets, e.g. distribution transformers, that may lead to a lower PQ. Also, another recent issue 
observed by electric utilities is that some residential clients are not complying with the DER 
regulations to increase their DER generation and reduce the net energy purchased by the utility. 
BDA techniques based on ML could also be used for detecting excess of DER generation beyond 
regulatory limits. 
(d) Continuous monitoring of voltage magnitude along the distribution feeders and at 
reactive control devices such as capacitor banks, allows detection of PQ disturbances including 
long-duration RMS variations (interruption sustained, undervoltages, overvoltages, and current 
overload) and voltage and current imbalances.  
(e) By monitoring current and voltage waveforms at the substation interconnection of 
distribution feeders, the downstream impedance can be calculated to estimate the distance or 
location of a fault resulting in a voltage sag. For significantly reduce long interruptions and to also 
help in mitigating RMS voltage variations, it is necessary to have a technique to provide a precise 
fault location. 
(f) Fault diagnosis may be used for statistics related to restoration time and how to improve 
the restoration time after events and voltage management.   
(g) Continuous home appliance monitoring allows to have not only a more accurate load 
profile, but also allows the use of intrusive and non-intrusive load disaggregation through data 
analytics that uses the electric signature of every single load and may be useful for PQ purposes 
such as identification of harmonic sources and harmonic mitigation.  
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(h) Active monitoring of current and voltage distortion levels, load unbalances reactive 
profiles, and at the distribution, the side may help to improve the power consumption and PQ 
management.   
(i) Continuous monitoring of voltage distortion levels may be used for better installation 
of capacitor banks and/or optimization of Volt/VAR control; 
(j) Contribute to the PQ disturbance source identification, for example, harmonics 
propagation and other PQ application yet to be uncovered and developed in the future grid. 
3.5 Discussion 
This chapter explores the need of extended PQ studies in the future electric grid. It is 
expected to have high penetration levels of modern electronic loads and inverter-based generation 
which bring new types of harmonics and PQ issues. Traditional legacy PQ monitoring is not 
sufficient for identifying PQ related issues such as higher order current harmonics.  It is observed 
that the existing PQ monitoring and control practices should be enhanced to account for the 
expected increase of additional harmonics and PQ issues. It requires a drastic increase in the 
sampling rate to detect higher order harmonics thereby increasing in the data volume and the 
velocity in which it is monitored. PQ monitoring for the future grid could be one of the main 
reasons for big data accumulation in power systems.  
Another key aspect is that the current PQ standards need to be revised to account for current 
and upcoming changes of the power grid causing much higher order harmonics. This Chapter 
articulates how big data is related to the future power grid analytics and is a tool which could be 
used to extract hidden knowledge from the smart grid for PQ purposes. Still, more research is 
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necessary to have a better understanding of the generation, propagation, and impact of 






RECOMMENDED FUNCIONALITIES FOR IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY OF DERS2 
 
The legacy electric grid of the 20th century is transitioning into a modern smarter grid of 
21st century due to increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation at the distribution 
side, also known as DERs. Monitoring and control of such DERs requires extensive data-exchange 
and bidirectional communication networks. This bidirectional communication adds cyber 
vulnerabilities and risks for new types of cyberattacks that may have destructive impacts on power 
system operations. Since IEEE Std. 1547-2018 does not discuss cybersecurity measures for DERs 
yet, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems at all three levels: 
device, communications, and applications. This chapter discusses the current industry’s best 
practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes recommended functionalities for improving 
the cybersecurity posture of DERs. These practical recommended functionalities have been 
discussed and verified within the industry through a DER cybersecurity working group and are 
meant to improve the security of DERs at device level. 
4.1 Introduction 
The legacy electric grid was designed for a unidirectional power flow from the large 
electric machine-based generators located far away to the load centers. It was not designed to 
handle multiple sources of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as photovoltaic, storage, and 
                                                   
2 This chapter is a slightly modified and updated version of the original paper presented in [108]. This work 
was primarily performed at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO. 
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wind power. For the radial distribution network power flows in one direction. The modern grid, 
however, is transitioning to a bidirectional power flow due to increasing penetration of DERs [82]. 
Figure 4-1 depicts some of the main trends in the modern distribution systems. The monitoring 
and control of such DERs require data and communication that allow integration of DERs with 
the modern grid, but it also brings vulnerabilities for cyberattacks—security attacks that can have 
destructive impacts on a power system because of a lack of built-in security controls [4], [83]. A 
prime example is the recent cyberattacks targeting the Ukrainian electric grid [28], which is listed 
among others shown in Table 4-1. The utilities’ goals and objectives have not changed. Their 
prime mission is to provide safe, secure, and reliable electricity to the consumers. To meet such 
goals, some big steps toward improvement must be taken to add adequate security to these newly 
installed and constantly growing DERs [84]. 
 
Table 4-1 Recent cyberattacks 
Year Target Source of Attack Consequence 
2014 
Monitoring and 
control systems of 
several utilities in 
United States and 
Europe 
Spear phishing, Havex 
malware for watering 
hole attack 
Espionage to map 
devices on utilities` 













Industroyer or Crash 
Override malware 
Power outage to one-
fifth of Kiev [29] 
2015–
2017 





ware, watering hole 





VPN Filter malware 
(prevented 
successfully) 





Table 4-1 shows some of the recent cyber and physical attacks on the electric grid’s 
industrial control systems (ICS) and speaks to the urgency of securing all aspects of the critical 
infrastructure. To make the electric grid safer against cyber and physical threats, several industry 
standards and guidelines for cybersecurity have been developed and established. Existing 
cybersecurity frameworks address some issues related to the electric grid as whole, but there are 
not sufficient guidelines and procedures that can help vendors, utilities, aggregators, government 
institutions, and other partners adopt and implement the procedures to secure the data and 
communications of DERs [84]. Further, the attackers are constantly evolving and finding new 
exploitable vulnerabilities Thus, there is a critical need to create an effective and efficient way of 
securing next-generation DERs to be connected to the distribution grid [11], [87]. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Modern distribution systems and the increase of cyber-physical interdependency. 
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The key contributions of this chapter are providing (1) a summary of the DER advanced 
functionalities required by IEEE Std. 1547-2018 for interconnection of DERs to the grid, (2) a 
literature review on the commonly known and existing cyber vulnerabilities of DERs and their 
possible impact in smart distribution grid operation, and (3) a succinct set of recommended DER 
cybersecurity functionalities that can be incorporated to improve the device level cybersecurity of 
a DER. These recommendations are based on a consensus that was developed after a year-long 
discussion with the SunSpec/Sandia DER cybersecurity working group in partnership with 
utilities, vendors, manufacturers, and researchers. 
4.2 Modern DER Functionalities and Cyber-physical Impact 
IEEE Std. 1547-2018 is the current standard for interconnection and interoperability of 
DERs [88]. The modern distribution grid with DERs is a cyber-physical system and the impact of 
cyberattacks targeting DERs can have a cyber-physical impact. The main objective of traditional 
DERs was to inject active power into the grid whereas modern DERs have several new operating 
modes to improve the overall system operation and efficacy by dispatching active and reactive 
power [89]. If those advanced modes of DERs are compromised, the impact on the electric grid 
can be devastating [10], [90]. It is important to identify the functionalities of a modern DER and 
know the possible impacts if such modes either malfunction or become a target of a cyberattack. 
The key operation modes of a DER and the possible impact of loss of data integrity for such control 
systems are the following: 
a) Constant power factor mode: A DER operates at a constant power factor (PF) value. With the 
appropriate access, an attacker could change the PF to a very inductive or capacitive one and 
potentially could increase the system losses, create problems with the voltage regulation, and 
reduce the overall power quality of the electric system. 
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b) Limit active power mode: The amount of active power that can be injected by the DER is 
limited to a set point determined by the operator. The attacker could reduce the set point of this 
mode to zero watts. This reduces the amount of active power injected into the grid, therefore 
impacting the grid operation. 
c)  Constant reactive power mode: Similar to the active power mode, the DER injects a constant 
amount of reactive power defined by a set point. By changing the set point, an attacker potentially 
could set DERs to inject or absorb reactive power into the electric grid to cause under-voltage or 
over-voltage at the point of common coupling (PCC). 
d)  Voltage-reactive power mode (volt-var): The DER is designed to inject or absorb reactive 
power depending on the voltage level at the PCC and to maintain the voltage limit within the 
prescribed boundaries. The attacker could change the voltage-reactive droop curve to affect the 
grid voltage, potentially creating problems with the voltage control application. 
e)  Active power-reactive power mode (watt-var): In this mode, the DER actively controls the 
reactive power output as a function of the active power output following a linear active power-
reactive power characteristic curve. The attacker could change this characteristic curve to create 
problems to both voltage levels and power flows into the grid. 
f)  Voltage-active mode (volt-watt): DERs increase or decrease the amount of active power 
injected in the grid depending on the voltage level at the PCC. An attacker could change the setting 
of this mode to cause under-voltage and over-voltage at the PCCs. 
g)  Frequency droop mode (frequency-watt): A DER helps to control the grid frequency by 
increasing or decreasing the amount of active power injected by itself. An attacker could 
potentially change the DER droop curve and affect the electric grid system frequency. In a worst-
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case scenario, it could lead to a system frequency collapse just like in a cyberattack targeting large 
generators in a power system.  
 
 
Figure 4-2: Potential physical impact on the distribution systems due to cyberattacks. 
 
From the operating DER modes, it is clear how attackers could inflict multiple types of 
damage on the distribution system and its operation through a cyberattack, as summarized in Fig. 
4-2. It is important to emphasize that an attacker could have control over just one DER or multiple 
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DERs, and the number and size of the hacked DERs in a given attack could limit the impact of the 
consequences from such cyberattacks [84]. Further, the opponent could potentially use the DERs 
for malicious lateral movement to map the cyber-physical electric grid. Even though some 
investigative studies have already been done on this topic to measure the physical impacts on smart 
grids from cyberattacks, there still are many opportunities for research in this area [11]. 
4.3 DER Common Vulnerabilities and Cyberattacks 
The key security objectives to make a cyber-physical system safer are integrity, 
availability, and confidentiality of system data and services [91]. A security attack looks for system 
vulnerabilities and makes a deliberate attempt to evade the security services to gain unauthorized 
access to system information and control of system services. It is difficult to identify all possible 
vulnerabilities of a system, but it is a good practice to use security mechanisms to detect, prevent, 
and recover from commonly known threats and vulnerabilities [18]. Recent research has identified 
several security breaches and cyber vulnerabilities for DERs and based on the literature review  
[87], [90], [92]–[96], the following are the most commonly known vulnerabilities. 
(1) Man-in-the-middle (MITM): In the MITM attack, an opponent gains access over 
communication systems to manipulate the data exchanged between two devices in the system. If 
the attack is successful, the opponent could drop, modify, or add data.  
(2) Replay: The objective of this attack is to acquire and repeat, or delay, valid data from 
the system to cause malfunctions. 
(3) Eavesdropping: In this passive attack, the opponent tries to acquire valid data and 
information about the system of interest. Once information has been acquired, the opponent could 
use it for other malicious purposes or even other cyberattacks. 
58 
 
(4) Spoofing through security certificates: Security certificates are used to prove 
ownership of public keys and also to authenticate a client so he or she can use services from a 
server. If an attacker has unauthorized access to public key certificates, he or she potentially could 
gain unauthorized access to system monitoring and control and perform a data-modification attack 
later.  
(5) Denial of service (DoS): In this type of attack, the objective is to overload the 
communication network to limit the system availability and therefore prevent authorized users 
from having access to the grid monitoring and control functions. Because most of the electric grid 
control is centralized, this attack could have a significant impact on grid system operation.  
(6) Least privilege violation: An authorized system user should only have access to the 
information and functionalities that are necessary for a specific task. In this type of attack, the 
opponent tries to access unauthorized services to view and manipulate system data. Once the least 
privilege principle is violated, the attacker can perform a data-modification attack.  
(7) Brute force credentials: In this attack, either software or a person keeps trying to guess 
the password or a key on a cyphertext. This attack can be time-consuming. If the password is weak 
or if the cryptography has a small key, however, then the attacker has a better chance of succeeding. 
If the brute force credentials attack is successful, then the attacker could perform a data-
modification attack.  
 Notably, the listed vulnerabilities are the most common, but the list does not include them 
all. The research community is continuously working on identifying new vulnerabilities and 
finding new approaches to secure DERs. 
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4.4 Recommended Device Level Functionalities for Securing DERs 
To improve the electric grid`s cybersecurity posture, several industry standards and 
guidelines for cybersecurity have been developed and established. The North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) has developed cybersecurity requirements for critical infra-
structure protection (CIP). These requirements, however, apply only to issues of the bulk power 
system and are not applicable to DERs [97]. Similarly, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has developed a cybersecurity framework that suggests ways that 
organizations can develop processes to manage system cyber risks; however, it does not address 
the cybersecurity risks of DERs [98].  
In addition to the aforementioned efforts, other organizations have developed security 
standards and guidelines for power systems, including: (a) IEC Std. 62351 provides security for 
information exchange in power systems [99] and is widely used in Europe; (b) the U.S. Department 
of Energy developed the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model to provide cybersecurity 
benchmarks and guidance for utilities on effective risk-management processes with consideration 
of specific organizational requirements and constraints [100]; and (c) IEEE Std. C37.240-2014 
provides cybersecurity requirements for substation automation, protection, and control systems 
[65]. 
These are all designed to address the bulk energy system and do not address the 
particularities of DERs. Even though those standards and guidelines help to improve DER security, 
attackers are constantly evolving and finding new breaches for inflicting cyberattacks. IEEE Std. 
1547-2018 [88] is the most widely used standard in the United States for interconnection and 
operability of DERs, and this standard requires the specific communication protocols. Thus, this 
60 
 
chapter considers only the communication protocols for this standard, namely, IEEE Std. 1815 
(DNP3), SunSpec Modbus, and IEEE Std. 2030.5 (SEP2)/Common Smart Inverter Profile (CSIP). 
 
Table 4-2 Vulnerabilities of DER communication protocols 
Protocol MITM Replay DoS Eavesdropping Spoofing 
Data 
Modification 
SunSpec Modbus X 
X X X X X 
IEEE 1815 (DNP3) X 
X X X X X 
IEEE 2030.5 (SEP2)  
 X   X 
 
Previous research has identified vulnerabilities for many different communication 
protocols. Table 4-2 summarizes some (but not all) known vulnerabilities for such protocols [99], 
[101], [102]. The least privilege violation and brute force credentials attack have been combined 
into “Data Modification Attack,” a broader attack category that includes those two specific 
categories. SunSpec Modbus is the simplest of the three, and it has no security measures. DNP3 
has a few security measures, such as authentication and message integrity check. The IEEE Std. 
2030.5 (SEP2) is the only communication protocol from Table 4-2 that requires and implements 
cryptography [99], and while this protocol is resilient against most of the cyber threats listed in 
Table 4-2, it is not a complete solution to known vulnerabilities.  
 As related work, several research papers have been presented in the literature to help create 
an effective and efficient way of securing next-generation DERs that will be connected to the 
distribution grid [103]–[106]. On the other hand, this research effort focuses on practical 
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cybersecurity functionalities for DERs based on a year-long discussion with personnel from 
utilities, vendors, manufacturers, and researchers. These functionalities have been verified with 
the subgroup “DER Devices & Servers” within the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Working 
Group [107]. Outcomes of this research effort are the following recommended cybersecurity 
functionalities at device level for DERs and they help to protect the DERs from the vulnerabilities 
listed in section 4.3: 
a) Hardened Operating System: The distribution management systems (DMS) at the control 
center can be connected to other computer networks and are vulnerable to several types of cyber 
threats. Outdated software and lack of anti-viruses put the system at risk of having more 
vulnerabilities. Using up-to-date firmware and operating systems together with security services 
and software from the control center to DERs and communication systems is a necessary procedure 
to harden the whole ICT system for the distribution system. In addition, it is good practice to scan 
the whole communication network of the smart distribution system to detect connected devices 
and to identify the firmware and software status of all DERs. If the software or firmware of the 
DER is not up to date, then it should be updated to the latest and most secure version. This measure 
helps to protect from least privilege violation and DoS attacks. 
b) Roll-Back Firmware Update: Firmware is the driving software of the DER and—as is the case 
for most software—it can be updated to newer and improved versions. New firmware versions, 
however, also can have vulnerabilities or other security issues. In such cases, the DER should have 
a quick and effective roll-back firmware feature in place so the system rapidly can revert to the 
previous working firmware to limit any possible cyber-physical impact on the electric grid. 
c) Authentication: This is the process to verify user’s identity based on some known information. 
Users are granted different privileges for accessing system services based upon their 
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authentication. In the DER scenario, this security service is very important to ensure that utility 
personnel, customers, and vendors have different privileges for accessing the DER monitoring and 
control systems. This measure helps to protect DERs from least privilege violation. 
d) Password Management: If a cyber-physical system does not enforce use of strong passwords, 
then the system is highly vulnerable to brute force attacks. Thus, to increase the DER system 
security, a password-management system can be used as a tool to ensure that all users have strong 
passwords. Another important feature is to restrict access from a user that has consecutive failed 
log-in attempts. This measure helps to protect the distribution grid from brute force credential 
attacks and least privilege violation. 
e) Transport Layer Security (TLS): Transport layer security focuses on ensuring secure and 
reliable communication between two hosts in a network. The TLS protocol begins with a start 
request from the client to the server, then continues with the exchange of a specific set of messages 
that is known as the “TLS handshake.” After the handshake, the two hosts can exchange encrypted 
data. There are many cipher suites available for TLS cryptography, and a future work will provide 
recommended suites for DERs. This security protocol ensures encryption, authentication, and 
integrity of data in the transport layer. TLS version 1.2 or 1.3 should be included in the DERs. 
This measure helps to protect the DER against MITM, eavesdropping, replay, and spoofing 
cyberattacks. 
f) Certificate Revocation List (CRL): Certificate revocation is a security mechanism that uses 
public key infrastructure and provides a list of the status of a user certificate. It indicates whether 
the certificate has been revoked and thus should not be trusted. In the DER scenario, this security 
service is important to identifying and keeping track of devices and users that no longer have 
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authorization to access system services. This measure helps to protect DERs from least privilege 
violation, MITM, eavesdropping, replay and spoofing attacks. 
g) Expired Certificate: When a DER is deployed in the field for the first time, it receives a 
certificate that lasts the lifespan of the device so it can authenticate its connection with the 
distribution system control center. If the DER gets compromised, this lifetime certificate adds 
vulnerabilities. To avoid this vulnerability, the DER main certificate should have an expiration 
date and should be replaced at a certain given frequency. This measure helps to protect DERs from 
least privilege violation, MITM, eavesdropping, replay, and spoofing attacks. 
h) Session Renegotiation: When a client requests a TLS session after a previous session has been 
established, the standard TLS protocol uses stored information from previous sessions to skip some 
steps of the TLS handshake and to make the renegotiation of the session faster. This feature, 
however, introduces vulnerabilities to cyber threats. To overcome such weakness, it is 
recommended that if a TLS session has been active for longer than the maximum period permitted, 
then it should be renegotiated. Session identification resumption is a feature that can be used to 
protect against this type of breach. Therefore, this also should be a feature of the TLS protocol 
used for DER applications. This measure helps to protect DERs from MITM, eavesdropping, and 
spoofing attacks. 
i) Supply Chain: DERs typically incorporate components from multiple vendors, creating a 
complex supply chain. In such scenarios, if a single internal device or component is compromised, 
then the whole DER also could be com-promised. To avoid such security breaches, the whole 
supply chain should be carefully studied, and each component and device used for manufacturing 
DERs should come from trustworthy vendors and organizations. This measure helps to protect 
DERs from eavesdropping, and least privilege violation. 
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Another important aspect is that there is a trade-off between high cybersecurity levels and 
smooth electric system operation because the grid operation becomes more complex and there is 
a possibility of false-positive lockups affecting a healthy DER. This also could have a negative 
impact on system operation. Consequently, some utilities choose to turn off some DER security 
functions for the sake of simple system operation, but this practice creates vulnerabilities to 
cyberattacks. Finally, it is important to note that even when all the cybersecurity functionalities 
discussed herein are implemented, this does not guarantee zero vulnerabilities. Rather, it only helps 
to limit such DER vulnerabilities and their cyber-physical impact on DERs and distribution 
systems. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The distribution system is shifting towards a high penetration level of DERs, including 
sources of renewable energy. This trend requires an innovative method of distribution system 
operation. The recent IEEE Std. 1547-2018 is being used in the United States for interconnection 
and operability of DERs. Now, among other new operating modes appropriate to the recent trends 
in modern distribution systems, it allows dispatch of active and reactive power. The monitoring 
and operation of the new DER operating modes require an ICT system, which also adds new 
vulnerabilities and increased attack surface. The communication protocols recommended by the 
IEEE Std. 1547-2018 are Modbus, DNP3, and SEP2. These ICT standards all have security 
vulnerabilities, but the current version of IEEE Std. 1547-2018 does not yet have cybersecurity 
recommendations.  
This chapter summarizes some of the commonly known cyberattacks targeting DERs and 
the potential impact of such attacks on smart grid operation. Finally, it recommends a succinct set 
of DER cybersecurity functionalities that can be incorporated to improve the device level 
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cybersecurity of DERs. These recommendations are based on a joint effort that was developed 

















A TESTBED FOR VALIDATING ELECTRIC SYSTEM DATA CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
The main cybersecurity feature to keep the power system data privacy is data encryption. 
The basic idea of encryption is to convert a readable message, also known as plaintext, into a 
cyphertext, that is, encrypted information that cannot be readable by anyone. The fundamentals of 
cryptography are beyond the scope of this chapter. The focus of this chapter is to present and 
discuss two approaches for emulating real time electric system data traffic and how to use this data 
traffic to test and evaluate cryptography solutions for power systems. 
5.1 Cryptography Emulation Testbed Overview 
 
 




The first objective of the testbed is to emulate electric system data traffic in real time over 
a real communication network. The second objective is to sniff the data traffic from the 
communication network in real time and store in a testing machine so the captured data can be 
used later for cryptography test and evaluation. The figure below shows the big picture of the 
developed cryptography testbed.  
The testbed is comprised by the following parts: a set of utility controller and field device 
(or devices) real time emulators; a set of two cryptography module devices; a testing computer; 
and a real communication network. Each one of these parts are described in detail in this chapter.  
5.2 Utility Controller and Field Device Real Time Emulation 
In order emulate electric system real time data traffic in a realistic way it is necessary to 
use a pair of devices communicating to each other over a communication network. Utility 
controller uses communication messages for either monitor and control applications. For this 
testbed, one device is mimicking a utility controller polling measurement data from a photovoltaic 
inverter and the other device is mimicking a photovoltaic inverter and sends measurement`s data 
to the utility controller every time it receives a reading request.  The current standard for 
interconnecting distributed resources with electric power systems is the IEEE Std. 1547-2018 and 
it specifies that the communication protocol should be either, Modbus, DNP3, or SEP 2.0. To make 
the testbed more realistic the emulated data traffic should use one of the aforementioned 
communication protocols.  
5.2.1 Utility Controller Emulator Device 
The utility controller application was developed in Python and it is a Modbus client over 
Transport Control Protocol (TCP). The Python script establishes a TCP connection with the 
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Modbus server the field device and polls measurements the specified photovoltaic inverter every 
minute. The Python script runs on a Linux in a Raspberry Pi hardware device and it emulates utility 
controller reading requests in real time.  
5.2.1 Photovoltaic Inverter Emulator Device 
The photovoltaic application was also developed in Python and it is a Modbus server over 
TCP. The Python script receives TCP connections from Modbus clients and the sever has a local 
database that has historical data from a public data set. It provides active power generation data 
every time it receives a reading request. The Python script runs on a Linux in a Raspberry Pi 
hardware device and it emulates the data from the photovoltaic inverter in real time.  
5.3 Cryptography Module Devices 
There are several cryptography modules that can be used for encrypting/decrypting data 
using several types of encryption techniques. In general, they are data agnostic and they are able 
to encrypt data regardless of the communication protocol or application. For the sake of the testbed, 
two cryptography modules were used. The architecture and technical details of the modules used 
are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
5.4 Real Communication Network 
The encrypted data goes through a real communication network for the sake of realism. It 
could potentially be any communication network that has TCP protocol, but since there were only 
two emulation devices then the testbed network is comprised by simple point to point connections 
using ethernet cables. However, the communication network could also be wireless or based in 
any other communication technologies. In this testbed only one field device emulator was used, 
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but, if there are more, then it would be necessary to add either a network switch or a network 
router.  
5.5 Data Traffic Monitoring Machine 
The data traffic monitoring machine is a computer that is able to sniff the network traffic 
from the communication network. In this case, it was used a physical ethernet tap that is connected 
to the testing machine. The machine is used to capture all network packets by using “tcpdump” 
tool from Linux. All the captured information is stored in .pcap files that later are analyzed using 
Wireshark tool. The captured packets are then visualized, and several evaluations can be made. 
The main evaluation is whether or not the messages are cyphertext. However, the network packets 
also have time stamps, so this testing machine also has the capability of evaluating the latency 
impact of adding a cryptography module to the utility communication system.   
5.6 Virtualized Cyber-physical Environment based on Minimega 
Alternatively, to emulation the testbed, virtualization environment allows low-cost, rapid 
experimentation where computer hardware of monitoring and control applications (cyber part) of 
cyber-physical a system is virtualized, and it may be connected to real ICT and/or OT devices 
(physical part/hardware-in-the-loop). The possibility of connecting real ICT and/or OT devices 
adds realism to the experiment and the possibility of virtualizing OT devices allows rapid and 
affordable scalability of the experiments. 
Minimega is a manager of kernel based virtual machines and software defined networks 
that enables high accuracy cyber-physical experimentation in real-time that may combine 
hardware-in-the-loop real systems with virtualized computer and control systems that are 
consolidated in large physical server. Any computer with an operating system, or power system 
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controller (cyber part) may be virtualized in the environment in a seamless fashion. The physical 
part of power systems (power conductors, transformers et.) and communication systems (fiber 
optics cable, communication antennas) can be either done through hardware-in-the-loop, or it 
could also be done through simulation. In order words, Minimega can be used to leverage a highly 
accurate cyber-physical system testbed.  
 
 
Figure 5-2: Block diagram of a cyber-physical virtualization testbed for power systems. 
 
Fig. 5-2 shows how the Minimega virtualization platform can virtualize both ICT devices 
and power system control machines in a seamless fashion. Real ICT and/or power systems can be 
interconnected to Minimega for high accuracy experiments. Also, Minimega could potentially be 





This chapter presents two distinctive approaches to validate and evaluate cryptography 
solutions for power systems. The first approach is through experimentation using real time 
emulation of power system data traffic that allows high fidelity experimentation. Alternatively, 
virtualization allows fast deployment and large-scale experimentation. Either way the data traffic 
is monitored to validate the encryption and the cryptography increases the overall communicating 
latency. Data intense application such as PMUs could be heavily affected by the addition of 
cryptography, therefore the latency impact of cryptography for power systems is very important 







This research was divided in three main parts. The information and communication 
technology (ICT) system design for distributed energy resources was tested in a NS-3 model of 
the IEEE 34 bus distribution network. Such model was used to simulate and validate the proposed 
design methodology. The second part, regarding big data analytics for distributed energy 
resources, is based on both extensive literature review and mathematical equations for analyzing 
the amount of data increase in observed data from power quality analysis at distribution level. The 
third part regarding cybersecurity recommendations for distributed energy resources is based in 
the outcome of a working group combined with extensive literature review.  The main conclusions 
of each research effort are the following: 
6.1 Information and Communication System Design for Distributed Energy Resources  
The first observation is that the speed and volume of data traffic from distribution systems 
is significantly different when the raw physical information (e.g. load data) is used versus the data 
encapsulated in the distribution systems data models (e.g. IEC Std.61968). Therefore, for the sake 
of simulation and design of ICT systems, the data model and data traffic should not be simplified 
for the sake of accuracy between the model and the real system. Another observation is that there 
is no one best technology for designing ICT systems. There are trade-offs between the off-the-
shelf solutions that meet all the project requirements at different costs.  
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Additionally, for smart grids with large geographical areas and/or multiple applications, 
the ICT design could be a combination of two or more ICT technologies. Since there are multiple 
applications for a smart distribution system, it is necessary to assign different priorities to different 
applications. For instance, if an ICT network is being used for both AMI and smart inverter 
applications then the ICT network should prioritize all messages from smart inverters because it 
is a more critical application. The current scalability requirement only takes into account the 
possibility of increased number of intelligent devices for the current applications what increases 
both data volume and data speed, however, future DERs will also have increased data variety and 
data variability, so the scalability requirement should be revised to take into account those two 
factors as well.  
6.2 Big Data Analytics for Distributed Energy Resources 
The modern distribution systems are migrating towards high penetration of EVs, DERs, 
and modern electronics what brings new types of power quality issues, specially, regarding intra-
harmonics and supra-harmonics (h<2500). In order to control such undesired voltage and current 
harmonics the first step is to be able to monitor such high frequencies, however, up to date power 
quality meters have sampling rate limitations and cannot detect high order harmonics only up to 
the 50th order. Modern ICT combined with BDA for PQ monitoring may allow voltage and current 
monitoring at much higher sampling rates as compared to current monitoring devices. This 
approach may be used for monitoring the supraharmonics up to the 2500th order as well as 
monitoring the intra-harmonics, which are also significant grids with high penetration of EVs, 
DERs, and modern electronics. The increased sampling rate required will exponentially increase 
the volume and speed of data in distribution systems. That is why PQ monitoring for the future 
grid could be one of the main reasons for big data accumulation in power systems.  
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In the other hand, big data from distribution systems could be used to provide large data 
sets for BDA what has potential to extract hidden knowledge and use it to enhance the way we 
currently perform monitoring and control of distribution systems. Among BDA applications the 
following are identified as prominent: It could be used for detection of PQ disturbances including 
long-duration RMS variations (interruption sustained, undervoltages, overvoltages, and current 
overload) and voltage and current imbalances; It could be used to estimate the distance and/or 
location of a fault resulting in a voltage sag; It could be used for fault diagnosis and enhanced 
statistics related to restoration time; It could be used to improve accuracy of load profiles; It could 
be used for non-intrusive load disaggregation through electric signature of every single load and 
may be useful for PQ purposes such as identification of harmonic sources and harmonic mitigation; 
Finally, it could contribute to the PQ disturbance source identification, for example, harmonics 
propagation. 
6.3 Cybersecurity Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resources 
The modern distribution system is shifting towards a high penetration level of DERs, 
including sources of renewable energy. The high penetration of DERs requires more ICT devices 
for monitoring and control of such applications. This trend increases the attack surface of smart 
grids, specially, because many DER devices may be connected to the internet what facilitates a 
possible unauthorized intrusion.  
In the U.S. the recently updated IEEE Std. 1547-2018 is being used for interconnection and 
interoperability of DERs. This standard requires all DERs to use SunSpec Modbus, IEEE Std.1815 
(DNP3), or IEEE Std. 2030.5 (SEP2) as the ICT standard for communications. These ICT 
standards all have security vulnerabilities. Out of the three aforementioned protocols, SEP2 is the 
best option from the security view due to its inherent authentication, transport layer, and 
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cryptography. However, even SEP2 has security vulnerabilities. The current version of IEEE Std. 
1547-2018 does not yet have cybersecurity recommendations.  
Several DER cyber vulnerabilities have been identified by utility and academia. Among 
them, the most commonly known cyberattacks are:  Man-in-the-middle, replay, eavesdropping, 
spoofing through security certificates, denial of service, least privilege violation, and brute force 
credentials. It is important to mention that the research community is constantly working to 
identify new cybersecurity breaches.  
In a nutshell, the main cybersecurity functionalities that have been used in smart grids have 
been borrowed from the traditional cybersecurity fundamentals for information systems. The three 
main cybersecurity requirements are information privacy, availability and integrity. However, the 
type and behavior of distribution system data is very different from information systems data due 
to its cyber-physical nature. Therefore, cybersecurity tools originally designed for information 
systems not always may be a good fit for smart grids.  
Many DER cybersecurity solutions have already been presented in the literature so far. 
This research combined a joint effort that was developed after a year-long discussion among 
utilities, vendors, manufacturers, and researchers with extensive literature review to select a 
succinct set of DER cybersecurity functionalities that can be incorporated to improve the device 
level cybersecurity of DERs. The set of recommended cybersecurity for DERs at device level is: 
• Hardening operating system 
• Roll-back firmware update 
• Authentication 
• Password management 
• Transport layer security 
• Certificate revocation list 
• Expired certificate 
• Session renegotiation 
• Supply chain 
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Another important point is that in spite of several cybersecurity tools currently available 
for DERs, many utilities still choose not to use them for the sake of smooth operation. Further, 
there are some tradeoffs between adding cybersecurity features and the distribution system 
performance. For instance, adding encryption added communication latency due to the processing 
time of such algorithms.  
6.4 Discussion 
The main observation from all the research from the research in this thesis is that the 
scalability and cybersecurity aspects of ICT design in terms for DERs (and also for smart grids in 
general) will most likely become outdated. The main reason is that traditional scalability only takes 
into account increasing the number of devices. The use of data analytics for enhancing DERs 
monitoring and control together with cybersecurity functionalities will bring significant changes 
to the data traffic of smart distribution systems.  
Finally, it is important to mention that all the recommended cybersecurity functionalities 
proposed here will only help to mitigate the cyber vulnerabilities of DERs and they could also be 












The future work will focus on new cybersecurity solutions for power systems with DERs. 
It will be divided into three projects based on the objective layers of cybersecurity, that are: 
prevention, detection, and mitigation of cyberattacks targeting the electric utility. Specifically: 
• Prevention of cyberattacks in power systems: In this area the future work will focus 
on cryptography for power system data. The research will try to reduce the overall 
additional latency added from cryptography. 
•  Detection of cyberattacks in power systems: This area of future work will focus on 
developing new algorithms for intrusion detection. They will make use of tools 
such as data analytics and machine learning.  
• Mitigation of cyberattacks in power systems: This area will make use of cyber-
physical risk analysis with mitigation plans to find quick ways to mitigate the 
damage of a cyberattack that has already taken place in a cyber-physical system.  
Additionally, the area of cyber-physical risk management in power systems is also an area 
that is still in its early days of development. Incorporating the advanced DERs and high penetration 







SUPPLEMENTAL ELECTRONIC FILE 
 
One of the contributions of this thesis is a cyber-physical simulation model developed in NS-3 for 
the IEEE 34 bus system. The source code of the model can be found in the script 
ami_ieee_34_bus_plc_v7.cc, that is basically a C++ script. In summary, the aforementioned script can be 
used for replicating the results from chapter 2, or it could potentially be modified for modeling other 
communication networks. Note that this simulation used NS-3 version 3.26 and it was simulated on a 
Ubuntu 14.04 computer. 
 
Network Simulator 3 File Description 
ami_ieee_34_bus_plc_v7.cc 
This C++ script contains the cyber-physical 
model of an advanced metering infrastructure 
application comprised of 330 smart meters 
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